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I. INTRODUCTION
During the mid-1970s there were dramatic increases in both
the number and severity of medical malpractice claims. The courts
were inundated with these claims, and costs such as medical
malpractice insurance skyrocketed. These factors resulted in a
wide variety of legislation aimed at halting this medical malprac-
tice crisis.'
The most common legislative proposals to alleviate the medical
malpractice crisis included limiting the amount of the plaintiff's
recovery or the amount of the defendant's liability, reducing the
period of time within which a medical malpractice suit could be
filed, abrogating the collateral source rule, establishing a media-
tion screening panel, and establishing mandatory or voluntary ar-
bitration hearings.2
The establishment of mediation panels and arbitration hear-
ings constituted the major focus of reform. Through these pro-
cedures the state legislatures expected to reduce the costs of
medical care and the volume of litigation by encouraging prompt
and early settlement of meritorious claims. 3
At least twenty-seven states have passed statutory provisions
that establish mediation or arbitration panels to review malprac-
tice claims.4 Although some of the statutes vary in structure,5
they all raise two serious constitutional issues: a possible denial
of the right to trial by jury, and equal protection under the laws.
The purpose of this Note is to examine the continued viability of
the legislative alternatives to medical malpractice litigation in light
of the constitutional issues raised above.
1. Seegenerally Redish, Legislative Response to the Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis:
ConstitutionalImplications. 55 TEX. L. REV. 759 (1977); AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION. SPECIAL
TASK FORCE ON PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY AND INSURANCE. PROFESSIONAL LIABILITYIN THE '80s: REPORT
2. at 4 (Nov. 1984) ("A crisis occurs when a substantial number of physicians feel they either
can't get or cant afford the malpractice insurance.").
2. Redish. supra note I. at 761.
3. Sakayan. Arbitration and Screening Panels: Recent Experience and Trends. 17 FORUM
682. 683 (1981).
4. Note. Medical Malpractice Mediation Panels: A Constitutional Analysis. 46 FORDHAM L.
REV. 322. 324 (1977).
5. See Jones. Medical Malpractice Litigation: Alternatives for Pennsylvania. 19 DUKE L.J.
407. 408 n.2 (1981). Compare N.H. REv\ STAT. ANN. § 519-A:2 (1974) (the plaintiff is the only
party having the option to submit to the procedure) with VA. CODE § 8.01-581.2 (1984) (sub-
mission by either party authorized) and OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.21(A) (Page 1981) (man-
datory submission).
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II. MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION PANELS
Mediation and arbitration panels are significantly different.
Mediation panels are applied at an early stage in medical malprac-
tice actions to screen claims. The purpose of mediation panels is
to encourage settlement of meritorious claims, and to eliminate
spurious claims. 6 The majority of mediation panel legislation
mandates that the parties submit their claims to the panel. 7 The
panel usually consists of a member of the legal profession, 8 at
least one member of the medical profession,9 and a nonlegal,
nonmedical, neutral person. 10 Although the proceedings are con-
sidered adversarial in nature, strict adherence to the rules of
evidence and procedure is not required."
A mediation panel's findings are not legally binding, and the
parties can proceed with a trial de novo. 12 However, most states
permit the panel's findings to be admitted at trial. The question
then arises whether admitting the panel's findings might unduly
influence the jury's evaluation. 13 The question of admissibility
poses a Catch-22 situation. If the panel's findings are admitted at
trial, the panel loses its mediative purpose and merely becomes
an added burden to the litigation process. But if the findings are
not admissible, then the parties have little or no deterrence to pro-
ceed to a trial de novo, and the panel becomes a wasteful and cost-
ly rehearsal.1 4 To the extent that mediation panels merely supple-
ment the litigation process, the added cost and delay may effec-
tively deter the litigation of meritorious claims.' 5 The added
burden of mediation screening falls most heavily on the plaintiffs'
ability to assert their claims, thus constitutional attacks focus on
the cost, efficiency, and fairness of the particular state's
6. Note. supra note 4.
7 Note, Restrictive Medical Malpractice Compensation Schemes: A Constitutional "guQd
Pro guo" Analysis 7b Safeguard Individual Liberties. 18 HARV J. ou LEGIS 143, 150 (1981).
8. Note supra note 4. at 351.
9. Sea eg.. N.Y. JUD. LAW §148-a(3)(b] (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1985).
10. Note. supra note 4, at 351.
11. E.g.. ARM. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-567(D) (1982 & Supp. 1984).
12. Sakayan. supra note 3, at 686. Maryland is the only state in which the panel's findings
are binding and converted into judgments. However, the Maryland plan is a hybrid arbitra-
tion/mediation panel. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 3-2A-01.-2A-06 (1984).
13. See Note, supra note 4. at 334. But see Beatty v. Akron City Hospital. 67 Ohio St. 2d
483, 490, 424 N.E.2d 586, 591 (1981) (the net effect of the panel's decision is to provide the
jury with an additional expert opinion by way of panel decision, so that the jury still remains
final arbitrator of all facts).
14. Note supra note 7 at 151.
15. There are no reported studies available demonstrating that mediation panels actually
deter nonmeritorious claims. In fact, the scant evidence available indicates that the filing of
meritorous claims has been deterred. See Margolick, Mediation Isn't Cure for Patients Claims.
2 NAT'L L.J. 1. 34 (1980).
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process.'
6
The essential feature distinguishing arbitration panels from
mediation panels is the finality of the arbitration panel's findings.
Although binding arbitration may either be mandatory or volun-
tary, no state has mandated the use of binding arbitration in
medical malpractice cases. However, several states have enacted
legislation expressly authorizing or regulating voluntary binding
arbitration of such cases. 17 These arbitration awards are final
and subject to appeal only on limited grounds.' 8
The majority of states that have adopted arbitration panels
have made their use mandatory but not binding; an appeal or trial
de novo is permitted.19 Once the arbitration hearing has ended
and the panel has made its ruling, some states require the plain-
tiff to post a substantial bond before proceeding to trial.20 This
requirement may prevent meritorious claims from going forward
and thereby deny the plaintiff's constitutional right to a trial by
jury.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. Trial by Jury
The United States Supreme Court has never incorporated the
seventh amendment right to a civil jury trial into the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment; thus, whatever constitutional
right to a civil jury trial exists in state courts must originate in
that state's constitution.21 Every state, with the exception of Col-
orado and Louisiana, has constitutional provisions for a right to
a jury trial in civil actions. 22
Claims that the right to a jury trial is violated because of the
use of mediation or arbitration hearings appear to have no basis.
16. See Mattos v. Thompson. 491 Pa. 385,421 A.2d 190 (1980) (holding unconstitutional
specific provisions of the Pennsylvania Health Care Services Malpractice Act because they
resulted in oppressive delays and impermissibly infringed upon the right to jury trial).
17. See MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. §§ 600.5040-.5065 (West Supp. 1985).
18. Under the Michigan Malpractice Arbitration Act (MMAA), an appeal from an arbitra-
tion award may be taken only in accordance with the procedure and for the grounds permitted
under the general arbitration law and applicable court rule. MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 600.5057
(West Supp. 1985).
19. See OHIO Rev CODE ANN. § 2711.21 (Page 1981). Note, however, that § 2711.21(E) pro-
vides that any person may enter into an agreement to arbitrate or to be bound by the decision
of the arbitrators.
20. See. ag.. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-567(J) (1982 & Supp. 1984): MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 231.
§ 60B (Michle-Law. Co-op. Supp. 1985).
21. Redish. supra note 1. at 792 n.203.
22. Note. The Indiana Medical Malpractice Act: Legislative Surgery on Patients' Rights. 10
VAL. U.L. RE%, 303. 326 n.134 (1976).
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Except for voluntary binding arbitration, 23 mandatory mediation
or arbitration is not binding, and either party may seek a trial de
novo. State legislatures have diminished the right to a jury trial
in two ways. Plaintiffs are statutorily required to submit their
claims to panels before proceeding to trial, and the admissibility
of the panel's findings and decisions into evidence at trial usurps
the jury's function.
B. Prerequisite to a Jury Tral
The Illinois Supreme Court, in Wright v. Central DuPage
Hospital Association24 held that the Illinois statute requiring a
hearing by a mediation panel prior to trial infringed upon the con-
stitutionally protected right to trial by jury. Arguably, this portion
of the ruling is merely dicta because the court had already held
the statute unconstitutional based upon the separation of powers
requirement before deciding the right to jury issue. 2 5 The court
then noted "[Blecause we have held that these statutes providing
for medical review panels are unconstitutional, it follows that the
procedure prescribed therein as the prerequisite to jury trial is an
impermissible restriction on the right of trial by jury. ",26
Wright does not stand for the proposition that a mandatory
prerequisite to ajury trial is an impermissible burden on that right.
The Wright court limited its holding to situations in which the com-
position of the panel is unconstitutional and added "we do not im-
ply that a valid pretrial panel procedure cannot be devised. '27
In Carter v. Sparkman28 the Florida Supreme Court rejected
23. Voluntary binding arbitration, when there is a written agreement to be bound by panel
findings, does not violate the right to jury trial since that right can be waived by the written
agreement. See Redish. supra note 1. at 792 n.204. See also S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 21-25B-3
(1979) providing that the plaintiff be made aware in the arbitration agreement that he has
given up his jury trial right. California requires that a contract to arbitrate medical malprac-
tice disputes provide in at least 10-point bold red type that "you are giving up your right to
a jury or court trial" CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1295(b) (West 1982).
24. 63 Ill. 2d 313. 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976).
25. Id. at 322. 347 N.E.2d at 739. The court concluded that the statute was unconstitu-
tional based upon the finding that one of the three members of the panel, a judge. was not
devoting full time to his judicial duties and that the nonjudicial members, a private physician
and an attorney, were performing judicial functions. This conduct was in derogation of arti-
cle VI. section 1. of the Illinois Constitution which provides: "IT]he judicial power is vested
in a Supreme Court. an Appellate Court and Circuit Courts," and article VI. section 9 which
provides that the circuit court "shall have 'original jurisdiction' of all justiciable matters." ILL.
CONsT. art. VI, §§ 1, 9; see also Redish, supra note 1, at 794 n.219 (1977).
26. 63 Ill. 2d 313, 324. 347 N.E.2d 736, 741 (1976).
27 Id.
28. 335 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 1976). revg Solomon v. Memorial Hosp.. 43 Fla. Supp. 105 (Cir.
Ct. 1975). cert. denied. 429 U.S. 1041 (1977). Other cases reaching the same result include
Prendergast v. Nelson. 199 Neb. 97 256 N.W.2d 657 (1977) and Comiskey v. Arlen, 55 A.D.2d
304. 390 N.Y.S.2d 122 (1976).
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the conclusion reached in Wright and reversed the lower court's
holding that the Florida statute violated the right to "timely ac-
cess to the courts' 29 Recognizing that the pretrial mediation
panel puts "persons who seek to bring malpractice lawsuits.
to the expense of two full trials of their claim.. ",30 the court
understood that "reasonable restrictions prescribed by law" may
be imposed on the constitutional guarantee of access. 3 1 The
Florida Supreme Court concluded that "[e]ven though the prelitiga-
tion burden cast upon the claimant reaches the outer limits of con-
stitutional tolerance, we do not deem it sufficient to void the
medical malpractice law' 3 2
Four years later, however, the Florida Supreme Court did an
about-face in Aldana v. Holub.3 3 Although the court avoided ex-
plicitly overruling Carter, it held that the medical malpractice
statute had proved "unworkable and inequitable in practical opera-
tion," thereby denying due process and the right to a jury trial.34
The court found the entire Florida Medical Mediation Act
unconstitutional. 35
Subsequently, the same sequence of events occurred in Penn-
sylvania. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court initially refused to
declare unconstitutional a statutory requirement that malpractice
litigants submit their claims to an arbitration panel. 36 After two
more years of experience with that procedure, the court, in Mattos
v. Thompson,3 7 held that the lengthy delays in the arbitration pro-
cess denied malpractice litigants their constitutional right to trial
by jury, and declared the statute unconstitutional. 38 The Mattos
court evaluated the poor statistical record of the arbitration
panels. 38 The court determined that the legislative scheme grant-
29. Solomon v. Memorial Hosp.. 43 Fla. Supp. 105, 107 (Cir. Ct. 1975). This is the same
issue as the right to trial by jury. Note, supra note 4. at 329 n.52.
30. 355 So. 2d at 807 (England. J.. concurring).
31. Id. at 805.
32. Id. at 806.
33. 381 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1980).
34. Id. at 237. See infra notes 147-52 and accompanying text.
35. The court stated:
[TIhis opinion will have prospective apolication only. In any case where the written
decision of the medical mediation panel has been filed on or before the date this
decision is filed [Feb. 28. 1980). a party may introduce that decision in evidence. In
all other cases, medical mediation proceedings are hereby terminated and declared void
as of the above filing date.
Aldara % Holub. 381 So. 2d 231. 238 (Fla. 1980).
36. Parker v. Children's Hosp.. 483 Pa. 106. 394 A.2d 932 (1978).
37. 491 Pa. 385.421 A.2d 190 11980): accord Hellerv. Frankston. 504 Pa. 528.475 A.2d
1291 (1984).
38. The court rendered this statistical analysis:
The findings made by the Commonwealth Court indicate that the arbitration
187
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ing the panels "original exclusive junsdiction" could not achieve
its stated purpose of providing prompt adjudication of claims, and
therefore impermissibly curtailed a plaintiff's right to a jury
trial.39
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Paro v. Longwood
Hospital40 held that the Massachusetts Medical Malpractice Act's
requirement that the plaintiff post a two thousand dollar bond as
a prerequisite to a trial violated neither the right to a jury trial
nor free access to the courts. The Act allowed the trial judge to
reduce the bond for an indigent plaintiff, thus, the court found no
constitutional violation.4 1 The court further noted that Article 15
of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights states that the right
to a jury trial is not absolute. It "may be regulated as to the mode
in which the right shall be exercised so long as such regulation
does not impair the substance of the right" 42
The Arizona Supreme Court has viewed the bond prerequisite
for medical malpractice litigants in a different light. In Eastern v.
Broomfield,43 although holding that the mandatory mediation
panel was constitutional, the court did strike down the Act's re-
quirement that a plaintiff post a two thousand dollar bond as a
panels provided for under the Act are incapable of providing the 4prompt deter-
mination and adjudication' of medical malpractice claims which was the goal of
the Act. Nor has the arbitration system improved within the last year. Papers filed
with this Court included a statistical analysis of the health care panels up to May
31, 1980. These documents reveal that as of May 31, 1980, a total of 3,452 cases
had been filed with the Administrator and that only 936 of these cases had been
resolved, settled or terminated. This means that 73 per cent [sic] of the cases filed
with the Administrator have not been resolved. Even worse, six of the original 48
cases filed in 1976 remain unresolved, despite the passage of four years. No ex-
traordinary circumstances have been offered to explain this intolerable delay. Fur-
thermore, as of May 31, 1980, 38 per cent [sic] of the claims filed in 1977. 65 per
cent [sic] of the claims filed in 1978. and 85 per cent Isic] of the claims filed in
1979 remain unresolved. Such delays are unconscionable and irreparably rip the
fabric of public confidence in the efficiency and effectiveness of our judicial
system. Most importantly, these situations amply demonstrate that 'the legislative
scheme is incapable of achieving its stated purpose.
Mattos v. Thompson, 491 Pa. 385, 395-96. 421 A.2d 190. 195-96 (1980) (footnote and cita-
tions omitted); see also Heller v. Frankston, 504 Pa. 528, 475 A.2d 1291, 1295 (1984).
39. Even before the Mattos decision it was recognized that the Pennsylvania statute was
a failure. See Edelson v. Soricelli, 610 F.2d 131, 136 (3d Cir. 1979) (even though Pennsylvania
statute requiring arbitration of medical malpractice claims is "a resounding flop ' federal court
still applies state statute).
40. 373 Mass. 645. 369 N.E.2d 985 (1977).
41. Id. at 652-53, 369 N.E.2d at 990.
42. Id. at 654. 369 N.E.2d at 991; see also Orasz v. Colonial Tlavern. Inc.. 365 Mass. 131.
134, 310 N.E.2d 311,313 (1974) (quoting H. K. Webster Co. v. Mann. 269 Mass. 381. 385. 169
N.E. 151, 153 (1929)); Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973) (state can constitutionally restrict
recipient's court access by requiring filing fee for appeal from adverse welfare decision); United
States v. Kras. 409 U.S. 434 (1973) (a required payment of filing fee prior to filing bankruptcy
was upheld).
43. 116 Ariz. 576, 570 P.2d 744 (1977).
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prerequisite to appearing in court.44 The court found that the
medical malpractice litigant, because of the bond requirement, was
not "afforded an equal opportunity [for access] to the courts: 45
Cases such as those in Arizona,46 Pennsylvania 47 and Florida48
reflect the awareness that, although the acts are not unconstitu-
tional on their face, their operative effects make them unconstitu-
tional as applied. However, merely establishing a mediation panel
as a prerequisite to a jury trial cannot be said to deny the right
to proceed to a jury trial.49
Currently, other procedures are prerequisites to a jury trial, but
are nonetheless constitutional. Under Rule 53 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, litigants may use masters and special referees
to hear and decide certain issues. Courts have found this to be con-
stitutional and not violative of the right to a jury trial.50 One
court has likened the medical malpractice mediation panel to a
mandatory pretrial conference. 51
If the mediation/arbitration process is looked at as a device that
delays the trial process while meeting all other constitutional
tests,5 2 a mandatory prerequisite to a jury trial is not an un-
constitutional infringement upon that right.
C. Admissibility into Evidence
In many states, the panel's findings and decisions are admissi-
44. ARMI. RE V.STAT. ANN § 12-567(J) (1982 & Supp. 1984); Eastern v. Broomfield. 116 Ariz.
576. 585-86. 570 P.2d 744. 753-54 (1970). Subsequently, the bond requirement was omitted
from the statute. See generally ARiZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-567(l) (West 1982 & Supp. 1984). But
see Fahtimen v. Superior Court, 130 Ariz. 513. 637 P.2d 723 (1981). cert. denied. 454 U.S. 1152
(1982) (holding that there is no constitutional requirement to waive filing fees in a civil case
for indigents except when the suit involves a fundamental right). Note again that this analysis
is based on due process but is just as applicable in a right to a jury trial analysis. See supra
note 42.
45. Eastern v. Broomfield. 116 Ariz. 576. 585-86, 570 P.2d 744.753. Note again the court's
mixture of equal protection, due process and right to jury trial analysis.
46. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
47. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
48. See supra notes 28-35 and accompanying text.
49. See. eg.. Comment. Constitutional Challenges to Medical Malpractice Review Boards,
46 Tt..Nx. L. REXv 607 629 (1978).
50. Irving Trust Co. v. Trust Co.. 75 F.2d 280. 282 (2d Cir. 1935); see also Note. supra note
4. at 330.
51. Carter v. Sparkman. 335 So. 2d 802. 807 (Fla. 1976) (England. J.. concurring). cert.
denied. 429 U.S. 104 (1977).
52. A right to ajurv trial must also be satisfied in the many states that allow the panel's
findings or decision to be admitted into court as evidence. See infra notes 53-68 and accompa-
nying text. The panel procedure must also pass the equal protection test as well as other con-
stitutional tests that are beyond the scope of this Note. See infra notes 71-130 and accompa-
nving text.
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ble into evidence at trial.5 3 With one exception, 54 these states pro-
vide that the findings and decisions of the panel are not binding.
The influence that these decisions have upon the jury may thereby
infringe upon the parties' right to a trial by an impartial jury.55
An Ohio trial court agreed with this assessment in Simon v. St.
Elizabeth Medical Center,56 and held Ohio's medical malpractice
arbitration system unconstitutional. Under Ohio Revised Code sec-
tion 2711.21, the arbitrators' decision and testimony can be in-
troduced into evidence The court stated that this procedure "ef-
fectively and substantially reduces a party's ability to prove his
case, because that party n--st persuade a jury that the decision
of the arbitrators was incorrect, a task not easily accomplished
in view of the added weight which juries have traditionally accord-
ed the testimony of experts. 5 7
The trial court also stated that the compulsory arbitration con-
stricted one's right to a jury trial.5 8 The court concluded that
"[w]hile the right to proceed to a jury trial still exists under R.C.
Section 2711.21, it is clearly not a free and unfettered right as was
certainly intended by the framers of Article I, Section 5 of the Ohio
Constitution."59
In 1981 the Ohio Supreme Court ruled contrary to the Simon
principles. In Beatty v. Akron City Hospjtal60 the court held,
without referring to Simon, that Ohio Revised Code section
2711.21 is compatible with the right to a fair and impartial jury
trial.61 The court was not persuaded by the argument that the
53. See Note, supra note 4. at 352 for a listing of these states.
54. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-06(d) (1984) provides that the decision of the
panel is presumptively correct, but not binding.
55. Sea e-g., Note Ohio's RX for the Medical Malpractice Crisis: The Patient Pays. 45 U.
CIN L. REV. 90. 102 (1976) ("[A] jury may give undue weight to the findings and testimony of
the panel.:); Comment. Recent Medical Malpractice Legislation A First Checkup. 50 TOE. L.
REv. 655, 681 (1976) ("ITihe prejudicial effect of an admssible adverse panel report could be
virtually impossible to overcome ).
56. 3 Ohio Op. 3d 164. 172, 355 N.E.2d 903. 911 (Ct. C.P. 1976). The court also held that
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2307 42, 2307 43 and 2711.21 violated article I. section 2 of the Ohio
Constitution as well as the fourteenth amendment of the federal Constitution with respect to
equal protection and were, therefore, unconstitutional, void. and of no effect. Id. at 172. 335
N.E.2d at 912. Note. however, that the reference to OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2307 43 was dicta.
Id. at 172 n.3. 355 N.E.2d at 912 n.4.
57 Id. at 168. 355 N.E.2d at 908.
58. Id.
59. Id. The court did not invalidate the then newly enacted Montgomery County Court of
Common Pleas rule setting up a compulsory arbitration procedure for civil cases not exceeding
ten thousand dollars. Because the local procedure did not permit the arbitrators to testify or
have their decision introduced as evidence the court said that the local procedure "would seem
to be constitutionally valid." Id. at 169, 355 N.E.2d at 908.
60. 67 Ohio St. 2d 483, 424 N.E.2d 586 (1981).
61. Id. at 483. 424 N.E.2d at 587 (syllabus by the court). The court also held that OHIo
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jury would be unduly influenced by the panel's decision. The court
concluded that submission of the panel's decision only provided
additional evidence to be considered by the jury. "[Tlhe net effect
of the panel's decision is to provide the jury with an additional ex-
pert opinion by way of panel decision The jury should still
remain the final arbiter of all the factual issues presented. 
6 2
Beatty follows the view expressed by several states in earlier
court decisions. In Prendergast v. Nelson63 the Supreme Court of
Nebraska rejected both the defendant's implication that a jury
could not or would not objectively evaluate a medical review panel's
recommendation and the trial court's instructions regarding the
weight to be given it. 6 4 An important distinction must be made
between Prendergast and Beatty The Nebraska review panel in
Prendergast could provide only an opinion, whereas the Ohio ar-
bitration panel in Beatty had the authority to dispose of a claim.
The additional authority accorded under the Ohio procedure may
heighten the importance of the panel's decision or findings,
possibly enough to sway a jury.
The New York Appellate Court, in Comiskey v. Arlen,65 ruled
that the admissibility of the panel's findings did not usurp the
jury's function. The court opined that the jury is the ultimate ar-
biter of factual questions raised at trial. The panel's recommen-
dation is like an expert opinion, and the jury is to evaluate it as
such.6 6
Assuming the validity of the concerns expressed by the Simon
court, the panel's decision alone will not satisfy the burden of
proof,6 7 and the jury still makes the final determination. As one
New York trial court stated, "Historically, jurors for the most part
have proven their independence. They guard their roles with a uni-
que jealousy. They accept with obvious pride the admonitions of
the trial court that they are 'sole judges of the facts: "68
REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.21 Is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest, and does
not conflict with the right of equal protection guaranteed by article I. section 2 of the Ohio
Constitution. Id.
62. Id. at 490. 424 N.E.2d at 591.
63. 199 Neb. 97. 256 N.W.2d 657 (1977).
64. Id. at 109. 256 N.W.2d at 666.
65. 55 A.D.2d 304, 390 N.Y.S.2d 122 (1976), aff'd on other grounds, 4a N.Y.2d 696, 372
N.E.2d 34. 401 N.Y.S.2d 200 (1977).
66. Id. at 309. 390 N.Y.S.2d at 126.
67. But see supra note 56. See also Note. supra note 4. at 334.
68. Halpern v. Gozan. 85 Misc. 2d 753. 759. 381 N.Y.S.2d 744. 748 (S. Ct. 1976).
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IV. EQUAL PROTECTION
A. Judicial and Constitutional Tests
Critics challenge these legislative enactments on equal protec-
tion grounds because the mandatory medical malpractice panels
single out medical malpractice litigants for differential treatment.
Medical malpractice litigants claim discrimination because they
are subject to rules and procedures that do not extend to other tort
litigants.69 Only unjustified discrimination violates the equal pro-
tection clause of the Constitution. 70 The court must first define
the proper test of scrutiny before determining if the discrimina-
tion claim is justified.
Traditionally, one of two tests determines whether discrimina-
tion results in a denial of equal protection: the "strict scrutiny"
test7 l or the "rational basis" test.7 2 The strict scrutiny test is only
used when a suspect classification7 3 is involved, or when the
statute infringes upon one's "fundamental rights. '7 4 Once a fun-
damental right or suspect classification is shown to exist, the state
assumes the burden of proving the statute's constitutionality.7 5
The state must show that the statute satisfies a compelling state
interest and that no other workable alternative exists.7 6
The rational basis test is used when no suspect classification
or fundamental right exists. The court imposes a minimal level of
scrutiny under this test. Unequal treatment of classes of persons
is valid only if a reasonable basis exists between the classification
69. The equal protection clause states: "'No state shall deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws:' U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV § 1.
70. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471. 485, reh'g denied, 398 U.S. 914 (1970).
71. E.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
72. E.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
73. Examples of suspect classifications would be race, alienage national origin, or il-
legitimacy. Note, supra note 4, at 337 n.113.
74. The "'fundamental rights" are found in the first eight amendments to the Constitution
(The Bill of Rights) and, in addition, encompass those rights "so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479,487 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97. 105
(1934)). The ninth amendment of the Constitution guarantees these rights: "The enumeration
in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be constructed to deny or disparage others re-
tained by the people." U.S. CONsT. amend. IX, quoted in Griswold v. Connecticut. 381 U.S. 479.
487 (1965) (Goldberg. J., concurring). T determine what is a fundamental right. "[t]he inquiry
is whether a right involved 'is of such a character that it cannot be denied without violating
those "fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lies at the base of all our civil and
political institutions" " Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 493 (1965) (Goldberg. J..
concurring) (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45. 67 (1932)).
75. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,447 n.7 (1972); Beatty v. Akron City Hosp..
67 Ohio St. 2d 483, 491-92, 424 N.E.2d 586, 592 (1981).
76. Roev. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155, reh'g denied, 410 U.S. 959 (1973); Comment, Constitu-
tional Challenges to Medical Malpractice Review Boards, 46 TENN. L. REV. 607 615 (1979).
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and the objective of the statute. 7 7 The statute is usually found
constitutional when the minimal level of scrutiny is imposed.
78
Recently, the United States Supreme Court has applied an in-
termediate standard of review that is more vigorous than the ra-
tional basis test but less demanding than strict scrutiny.79 This
"substantial relationslnp' test has been essentially limited to semi-
suspect classifications, such as gender-based discriminatory
statutes.80 At least three states have used this test but nothing in-
dicates that any other state will apply this intermediate standard
of review to determine the constitutionality of their medical
malpractice statutes.81 This Note will focus only upon the two
traditional tests: strict scrutiny and rational basis.
B. Testing the Statutory Basis
In American Bank and Trust Co. v. Community Hospital,8 2 the
plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of a provision of the
California Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975
(MICRA),8 3 codified as section 667 7 of the California Code of
Civil Procedure. Although the constitutional challenge did not con-
cern the establishment of a medical malpractice arbitration or
mediation panel, the court's analysis is analogous to that used in
determining the constitutionality of such panels. Section 667 7
provides that when a plaintiff in a medical malpractice case has
sustained "future damages" of fifty thousand dollars or more, com-
pensation for those future damages is to be paid periodically rather
than in a lump sum.
77. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420.425-26 (1964): Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S.
522.530 (1959); Beatty v. Akron City Hosp., 67 Ohio St. 2d 483,491-92,424 N.E.2d 586, 592
(1981).
78. But see Boucher v. Sayeed. 459 A.2d 87 (R.I. 1983) (holding that because there was
no medical malpractice cnsis to justify enactment of such legislation, the statute creating a
system for processing of medical malpractice complaints violated the equal protection of the
laws).
79. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); Comment. Constitutional Challenges To
Medical Malpractice Review Boards. 46 TENN. L. REv. 607, 615 (1979).
80. See. e.g.. Lalli v. Lalli. 439 U.S. 259, 265 (1979) (illegitimacy); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S.
71, 76-77 (1971) (gender).
81. Jones v. State Board of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859,555 P.2d 399 (1976). cert. denied. 431
U.S. 914 (1977): Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925,424 A.2d 825 (1980); Arneson v. Olson. 270
N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978). Carson held the entire state statute unconstitutional. The court
justified using the -substantial relationship" test by stating. "we are not confined to federal
constitutional standards and are free to grant individuals more rights than the Federal Con-
stitution requires" Carson v. Maurer. 120 N.H. 925. 932. 424 A.2d 825. 831 (1980).
82. 36 Cal. 3d 359, 683 P.2d 670. 204 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1984).
83. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 667.7 (West 1980).
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In American Bank, the plaintiff received a jury verdict for
almost two hundred thousand dollars.84 The defendant moved for
an order of periodic payments pursuant to section 667 7 The lower
court concluded that this provision of the Act denied equal pro-
tection by granting a privilege to health care defendants that was
not afforded to other defendants. The court concluded that by
"tax[ing] an impermissible special class [of plaintiffs] for the pur-
ported benefits to be enjoyed by the general public," the legislature
acted with sufficient "arbitrarliness] as to deny equal
protection. ' 8 5
On appeal, the California Supreme Court found that applying
section 667 7 to medical malpractice actions did not violate equal
protection principles.8 6 The court, using the rational basis test,87
found that the periodic payment provisions were rationally related
to the objective of reducing insurance costs.8 8 Since the
legislature's decision to reduce insurance costs in the medical
malpractice area had a rational basis, there was no equal protec-
tion violation.8 9 But this last statement merely restates the ques-
tion. The court did not disclose how they determined that the
legislature had a rational basis for reducing insurance costs, but
simply declared that the legislature was responding to a medical
malpractice insurance "crisis. ' 90 When confronted with the ques-
tion of whether a crisis actually existed, the court side-stepped the
issue by saying that "Jilt is not the judiciary's function to
reweigh the 'legislative facts' underlying a legislative enact-
ment."' 9 In effect, the court assumed that a rational basis for the
discriminatory treatment existed.
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island, in Boucher v. Sayeed,9 2
was not willing to make the general assumption made in American
84. American Bank and Trust Co. v. Community Hosp.. 36 Cal. 3d 359.365. 683 P.2d 670.
673. 204 Cal. Rptr. 671, 674 (1984].
85. American Bank and Trust v. Community Hosp.. 104 Cal. App. 3d 219 (opinion deleted).
163 Cal. Rptr. 513. 521 (1980).
86. American Bank and Trust Co. v. Community Hosp.. 36 Cal. 3d 359.371. 683 P.2d 670.
679. 204 Cal. Rptr. 671, 680 (1984).
87 The court stated: "Although several amici urge the court to apply a stricter standard
of review, the governing authorities-both federal and state-establish that the traditional ra-
tional [basis] standard is applicable here." Id. at 373 n.12. 683 P.2d at 679 n.12. 204 Cal. Rptr.
at 680 n.12.
88. Id. at 372-73. 683 P.2d at 678, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 679.
89. Id. at 373, 683 P.2d at 679. 204 Cal. Rptr. at 680.
90. Id. at 371, 683 P.2d at 677 204 Cal. Rptr. at 678.
91. Id. at 372, 683 P.2d at 678. 204 Cal. Rptr. at 679.
92. 459 A.2d 87 (R.I. 1983).
1985] MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MEDIATION PLANS 195
Bank. The Boucher court employed the rational basis test 93 to
determine that mandatory mediation panels enacted by the
Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 197694 violated the constitu-
tional guarantee of equal protection. The court also took judicial
notice in assessing that a malpractice crisis no longer existed.
9 5
Although at the time of its creation the Rhode Island medical ... panel
may have been a rational response to the malpractice 'crisis', the present
need for such a procedure... no longer exist[s] .... [Tihe state malprac-
tice statute [doesi not withstand an equal protection challenge even under
the rational basis test because the panel system.., no longer serveisi a
legitimate governmental function.
9 6
While challenged legislation enjoys a presumption of constitu-
tionality,9 7 the Boucher court found that the plaintiffs successful-
ly rebutted the legislative presumption of constitutionality. The
plaintiffs demonstrated that the statute lacked sufficient rational
basis to justify the differential treatment it received.98
Rhode Island is one of few states to successfully challenge its
state legislature's conclusion that a medical malpractice crisis ex-
ists, a conclusion that provides a rational basis for statutory enact-
ments. In Wisconsin ex. rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie,99 the plaintiff
argued that the court should subject Wisconsin's Health Care
Liability and Patients Compensation Act' 0 0 to the strict scrutiny
test. 10' The court used the rational basis test, however, since
neither a fundamental right nor a suspect class was involved, 1
0 2
and concluded that the legislature acted upon a rational basis. 103
The plaintiff in Wilkie rebuked the rational basis argument,
93. The court found that the classifications created by the statute neither infringed upon
fundamental rights nor employed suspect classifications. Boucherv. Sayeed, 459 A.2d 87. 91-92
(R.I. 1983). Most courts reviewing malpractice reform acts have reached similar conclusions.
See. eg.. Beatty v. Akron City Hosp.. 67 Ohio St. 2d 483. 424 N.E.2d 586 (1981). This finding
precludes the use of the strict scrutiny test. But see Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center.
3 Ohio Op. 3d 164. 355 N.E.2d 903 (Ct. C.P. 1976) in which the court never expressly stated
the applicable standard forjudicial scrutiny but the reasoning and results suggest the "strict
scrutiny" test was applied.
94. R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 10-19-1 to 10-19-5 (Supp. 1984).
95. Boucher v. Sayeed. 459 A.2d 87. 92 (R.I. 1983).
96. Id. (quoting Note. The Rhode Island Medical Liability Mediation Panels: Constitutional
Challenges and Impact on Informed Consent. 15 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 563. 578-79 (1981)).
97. Boucher v. Sayeed. 459 A.2d 87. 92 (R.I. 1983).
98. Id. at 94.
99. 81 Wis. 2d 491. 261 N.W.2d 434 (1978).
100. Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 655.02-.21 (West 1980 & Supp. 1985).
101. Wisconsin ex. rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491. 506. 261 N.W.2d 434. 441
(1978).
102. Id. at 507. 261 N.W.2d at 442.
103. Id. at 508. 261 N.W.2d at 442.
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contending that no medical malpractice crisis existed.'0 4 The
court based its decision on whether the legislature acted upon a
reasonable basis that might have existed.'0 5 Many courts defer to
a legislature's conclusion that a medical malpractice crisis
exists. 106
C. Testing Unequal Procedures for Tort Litigants
Mandatory mediation and arbitration panels were conscious-
ly designed to handle only medical malpractice claims and not
other tort or liability claims. The question arises whether medical
malpractice claimants are subject to discrimination prohibited
under the equal protection guarantee.
An Ohio trial court faced this question in Simon v. St. Elizabeth
Medical Center.0 7 As discussed above, the court concluded that
the compulsory arbitration requirements of Ohio Revised Code sec-
tion 2711.21 violate the equal protection clause by benefiting
medical malpractice defendants with pretrial panel hearings
unavailable to defendants in other tort cases.'0 This "benefit"
translated into additional burdens of time and expense to plain-
tiffs, beyond those imposed in nonmedical claims.
The Simon court did not specify whether it utilized the strict
scrutiny or the rational basis test in determining the constitu-
tionality of section 2711.21. The court simply agreed with the
analysis used in Graley v. Satayatham.0o, another Ohio trial court
case. The Graley court ruled that other provisions of the Medical
Malpractice Act ' 0 violated equal protection rights because they
also conferred benefits on medical malpractice defendants that
were unavailable to other tort defendants."' The court never
determined whether the case involved a fundamental right or a
suspect classification, but apparently used the strict scrutiny test
104. Id. at 507, 261 N.W2d at 442.
105. Id. at 508. 261 N.W.2d at 442 (emphasis added); see also American Bank and Trust
Co. v. Community Hosp.. 36 Cal. 3d 359. 372. 683 P.2d 670. 678. 204 Cal. Rptr. 671. 679 (-It
is not the judiciary's function. however, to reweigh the 'legislative facts* underlying a legislative
enactment.").
106. See Eastin v. Broomfield. 116 Ariz. 576, 570 P.2d 744 (1977): Pinillo v. Cedars of
Lebanon Hosp. Corp.. 403 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 1981): Prendergast v. Nelson. 199 Neb. 97. 256 N.W.2d
657 (1977); Comiskey v. Arlen, 55 A.D. 304,390 N.Y.S.2d 122 (1976); Beatty v. Akron City Hosp..
67 Ohio St. 2d 483.424 N.E.2d 586 (1981). But see Aldana v. Holub, 381 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1980).
107.3 Ohio Op. 3d 164, 355 N.E.2d 903 (Ct. C.P. 1976): see supra notes 58-61 and accom-
panying text.
108. Id. at 167. 355 N.E.2d at 906.
109. 74 Ohio Op. 2d 316. 343 N.E.2d 832 (Ct. C.P. 1976).
110. OHfo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2305.27, 2307.42 (Page 1981).
111. Grayley v. Satayatham, 74 Ohio Op. 2d 316, 319. 343 N.E.2d 832. 836 (Ct. C.P. 1976).
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to find that no compelling governmental interest satisfied the
separate and unequal treatment conferred by the Medical Malprac-
tice Act. 1 12 The Simon court, by relying on the Graley analysis,
implicitly adopted the strict scrutiny test. If this is an accurate
assessment, Simon and Graley are in a distinct minority of cases
finding the strict scrutiny test appropriate to determine the con-
stitutionality of medical malpractice arbitration." 3
The Ohio Supreme Court did not adopt Graley or Simon. In
Beatty v. Akron City Hospital"4 the court rejected the strict
scrutiny test because no fundamental right existed since the court
earlier had. determined that the Medical Malpractice Act did not
deny the fundamental right to a jury trial.115 Further, the court
found no establishment of a suspect classification. 1 6 The Beatty
court determined that the rational basis test applied,17 and that
the mandatory medical arbitration panel" 8 represented a rational
response by the legislature to the medical malpractice crisis.
The panel provision was thereby constitutional." 9 Litigants
presented a different equal protection attack to the Massachusetts
Supreme Court. In Paro v. Longwood Hospital, 120 the court faced
the problem of unequal treatment between parties to medical
malpractice claims. The Massachusetts statute provided that if the
mediation screening panel's findings were adverse to the plaintiff,
the plaintiff had to post a two thousand dollar bond before pro-
ceeding to trial.' 2' However, if the findings showed a "legitimate
question of liability" of the defendant, the plaintiff did not have
to post a bond.122 The court used the rational basis test to uphold
the statute on the grounds that the legislature could have deter-
mined that requiring a bond would discourage frivolous medical
malpractice claims. 123 The court approved the statute's burden on
plaintiffs because the legislature could reasonably have determin-
112. Id. at 320. 343 N.E.2d at 837.
113. See supra note 95.
114. 67 Ohio St. 2d 483. 424 N.E.2d 586 (1981]; see infra notes 62-66 and accompanying
text.
115. Id. at 492, 424 N.E.2d at 592.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 492. 424 N.E.2d at 592.
118. Onlo REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.21 (Page 1981).
119. Beatty v. Akron City Hosp.. 67 Ohio St. 2d 483. 497. 424 N.E.2d 586. 595 (1981].
120. 383 Mass. 645.369 N.E.2d 985 (1977): seesupra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
121. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 231, § 60B (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1985).
122. Paro v. Longwood Hosp., 383 Mass. 645. 648, 369 N.E.2d 985. 987 (1977].
123. Id. at 651, 369 N.E.2d at 989.
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ed that plaintiffs are responsible for most frivolous malpractice
litigation. 124
The equal protection assault in medical malpractice claims is
not limited to cases in this Note. Virtually every state passed one
or more statutory provisions in response to the medical malprac-
tice crisis of the mid-1970s. The legislatures of nearly thirty states
have enacted statutes establishing mandatory arbitration or
mediation panels. 125
The legislative purpose behind mandatory mediation and ar-
bitration panels is to reduce the cost of medical care by reducing
the cost of malpractice insurance and encouraging settlement of
malpractice claims. 12 6 Many courts have accepted this goal as a
valid legislative purpose, and are extremely reluctant to set aside
a legislative enactment "if any state of facts may reasonably be
conceived to justify it." 127 An overwhelming majority of courts
have rejected the challenge that mandatory mediation or arbitra-
tion statutes improperly single out medical malpractice litigants
for unique treatment. 2 Only three state supreme courts have
reached a different conclusion. 29
Until more data is available to determine if the malpractice
panels are indeed serving their legislative purpose, their required
use should withstand an equal protection challenge.
V. CONTINUED VIABILITY
Much litigation has occurred concerning the constitutionality
of medical malpractice arbitration and mediation panels. During
the medical malpractice crisis and the peak period of legislative
response 30 to this crisis, the courts closely scrutinized the
124. Id.
125. See Note, supra note 4.
126. See generally Sakayan. Arbitration and Screening Panels: Recent Experience and
Trends. 17 FORUM 682 (1982).
127. McGowan v. Maryland. 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961): see also Beatty v. Akron City Hosp..
67 Ohio St. 2d 483. 493, 424 N.E.2d 586. 592 (1981) (quoting Allied Stores v. Bowers. 358
U.S. 522. 530 (1959). ("Ordinarily, under the rational basis requirement, any classification
based *upon a state of facts that reasonably can be conceived to constitute a distinction, or
differences, in state policy .. . will be upheld.")
128. The courts in 23 states and three federal circuits have rejected equal protection
challenges in this setting. For a listing of these courts. see American Bank and Trust Co. v.
Community Hosp.. 36 Cal. 3d 359. 370 n.10. 683 P.2d 670. 677 n.10. 204 Cal. Rptr. 671. 678
n.10 (1984).
129. Carson v. Maurer. 120 N.H. 925. 930-31. 424 A.2d 825, 830-31 (1980) (substantial
relationship test); Arneson v. Olsen. 270 N.W.2d 125. 133 (N.D. 1978) (substantial relation-
ship test): Boucher v. Sayeed. 459 A.2d 87, 92 (R.I. 1983) (rational basis test).
130. The peak period of legislative enactment of statutes dealing with the medical malprac-
tice crisis was 1975-1977.
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medical malpractice statutes and often found them to be un-
constitutional.' 3' This trend has given way to a shift toward
legislative deference.132
As more data becomes available regarding the performance of
these panels, a constitutional attack may again threaten their
viability. The Pennsylvania 3 3 and Florida 34 cases illustrate the
practical problems inherent in panel procedures, and may reflect
a different focus that other courts will soon adopt.
In Mattos v. Thompson, 35 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
ruled that the state's arbitration statute was unconstitutional after
evaluating the accomplishments of the panel system. 3r The court
stated that "sufficient time ha[d] passed to allow for a meaningful
evaluation.. 137 and concluded that the lengthy delay occasion-
ed by the arbitration system created a burden laced with "onerous
conditions, restrictions [and] regulations'" 38 The court's finding
demonstrated the statutory scheme's inability to provide an effec-
tive dispute resolution forum in the medical malpractice area. 3 9
A statistical analysis that reflected the panels' lack of success
influenced the Mattos 40 court's decision. The statistics revealed
that as of May 31, 1980, 3,452 cases were filed, but only 936 (27%)
were resolved or terminated. In fact, only six of forty-eight cases
originally filed four years earlier remained unresolved.' 4' The
Ma ttos court declared that "[s]uch delays are unconscionable and
irreparably rip the fabric of public confidence ... of our judicial
system:" 142
Pennsylvania's arbitration panel had received poor reviews even
before the Mattos decision. The Third Circuit in Edelson v.
Soricelli'4 : described the Pennsylvania Act as "a system that,
131. See. e.g.. Wright v. Central DuPage Hosp. Ass'n. 63 Il1. 2d 313. 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976):
Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 3 Ohio Op. 3d 164. 355 N.E.2d 903 (Cty. Ct. C.P. 1976).
132. See. e.g.. Prendergast v. Nelson. 199 Neb. 97. 256 N.W.2d 657 (1977: Wisconsin ex
rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie. 81 Wis. 2d 491. 261 N.W.2d 434 (1978).
133. Matios v. Thompson. 491 Pa. 385. 421 A.2d 190 (1980).
134. Aldana v. Holub. 381 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1980.
135. 491 Pa. 385. 421 A.2d 190 (19801.
136. The compulsory arbitration provisions of the Pennsylvania Health Care Services
Malpractice Act became effective October 15. 1975. See Parker v. Children's Hosp.. 483 Pa. 106.
1!3. 394 A.2d 932. 935 (1978): PA. S r,\T. ANN. tit. 40. §§ 1301.101-.1006 (Purdon Supp. 1985).
137. Mattos v. Thompson. 491 Pa. 385. 395. 421 A.2d 190, 195 (1980).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 397. 421 A.2d at 196.
140. Id. at 396. 421 A.2d at 195.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. 610 F.2d 131 (3d Cir. 19791.
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though theoretically sound, is actually a resounding flop" 144 The
court said that it would be futile for the plaintiff to "resort to a
state.., procedure that has proven to be ineffective, inefficient,
and incapable of operation under the ... statute '145
The Florida Supreme Court had an opportunity to reevaluate
its malpractice mediation system four months prior to Mattos. In
Aldana v. Holub,146 the court found that the act violated concepts
of due process because the statute proved arbitrary and capricious
in operation. 147 Although the Aldana court did not overturn its
earlier decision upholding the facial validity of the act, 148 the
court had authority to render the practical operation of the statute
unconstitutional. 49 The court painstakingly examined more than
seventy medical mediation claims, and concluded that the Medical
Mediation Act was unconstitutional in its entirety because of its
arbitrary and capricious operation.15 0
It is difficult to evaluate the success of many of the mediation
panels because of insufficient information. The Florida and Penn-
sylvania decisions may become the rule rather than the exception
should other states decide to evaluate whether the establishment
and use of their panels does in fact meet intended legislative goals.
IV. CONCLUSION
The public has a strong interest in encouraging and facilitating
settlement of malpractice claims. In theory, use of mediation and
arbitration panels is a reasonable means to accomplish this goal.
But as Florida and Pennsylvania have demonstrated, such panels
may not achieve the desired legislative objectives.
Whether the constitutionality of the mediation procedure is
evaluated in a challenge based on the right to trial by jury or the
equal protection guarantee is immaterial. The pressing question is
whether the panels are doing what they were enacted to do.
However, most courts adhere to the principal that constitutionali-
144. Id. at 136.
145. Id.
146. 381 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1980).
147. Id. at 238.
148. Carter v. Sparkman. 335 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 1976). The Aldana court emphasized that
its decision was not "premised on a reevaluation of the wisdom of the Carter decision. Rather.
it is based on the unfortunate fact that the medical mediation statute has proven unworkable
and inequitable in practical operation:* Aldana v. Holub. 381 So. 2d 231. 237 (Fla. 1980).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 236.
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ty does not depend on a court's assessment of the success or failure
of the statute's provisions.' 51
This Note is not intended to render a judgment on the constitu-
tionality of mediation and arbitration panels. Instead, it focuses
on difficulties inherent with panel procedures. This Note does not
address policy considerations underlying enactment of mandatory
dispute panels. At the time of the perceived malpractice crisis in
the mid-1970s, state legislatures responded too quickly. The result
was a superficial examination of whether such a crisis actually ex-
isted. At present, the legislation enacted is not dealing with a crisis,
whether manufactured or real.
The cost of medical care continues to rise despite legislation
and reductions in malpractice insurance premiums. According to
a California Hospital Association study of 65% of the state's
hospitals, the cost of malpractice insurance steadily increased
prior to enactment of MICRA in 1975.152 Such costs steadily
decreased thereafter until 1981 when the cost for $1,000,000 of
insurance coverage was 25% less than the 1975 level. 53
Between 1975 and 1981, the average daily charge for
hospitalization in a California community hospital increased from
$217 to $547 per day.. 4 These statistics are important because
hospital expenditures constitute more than 40% of the total ex-
penditures for medical care, more than any other component of
overall medical costs.'-5 - Thus, medical costs continue to rise
despite the existence of both malpractice legislation and declines
in insurance premiums.
Enacted medical malpractice legislation indicates not only the
strength of the medical and insurance lobbies, but also the historic
vulnerability of legislatures to do something when faced with a
151. See. e.g.. American Bank and Trust Co. v. Community Hosp.. 36 Cal. 3d 359,372. 683
P.2d 670. 679. 204 Cal. Rptr. 671. 681 (1984) ("whether in fact the Act will promote [the
legislative objectives] is not tie question: the Equal Protection Clause is satisfied by our con-
clusion that the [state] Legislature could rationally have decided that [it] ... might [do so]... :')
(quoting Minnesota v. Cluver Leaf Creamery. 449 U.S. 456. 466 (1981)). rehgdenied. 450 U.S.
1027 (emphasis in original).
152. See supra note 83.
153. See Brief for Amicus Curae California Hospital Association, American Bank and Trust
Co. v. Community Hosp.. 660 P.2d 829. 840, 190 Cal. Rptr. 371. 382 (1983).
154. American Bank and Trust Co. v. Community Hosp.. 660 P.2d 829. 840, 190 Cal. Rptr.
371. 382 (1983) (citing U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S. 111 (1981)
and CAL. HEALI H FACIL COM.. QIUARTERLY FIN. & UTILIZATION REP. No. 82-5. AGGREGATE HOSPITAL
DATA 4 (Apr. 15, 1982)).
155. American Bank and Trust Co. v. Community Hosp.. 660 P.2d 829. 840. at 190 Cal.
Rptr. 371. 382 (1983) (citing U.S. DEPr OF HEALTII & HUMAN SERVICES. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE.
OFFICE OF HEALTH RESEARCH. STATISTICS AND TECHNOLOGY 203).
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perceived pressing problem. Constitutional challenges to the
legislation have met with only limited success. However, if Penn-
sylvania and Florida indicate a new trend, the continued viability
of these malpractice panels, as they presently operate, may ex-
perience a renewed attack.
